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Abstract We prove the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
in nice games with isotone chain-concave best replies and compact strategy
sets. We establish a preliminary xpoint uniqueness argument showing su¢ cient
assumptions on the best replies of a nice game that guarantee the existence of
exactly one Nash equilibrium. Then, by means of a comparative statics analysis,
we examine the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions on (marginal) utility
functions for such assumptions to be satised; in particular, we nd necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the isotonicity and chain-concavity of best replies.
We extend the results on Nash equilibrium uniqueness to nice games with upper
unbounded strategy sets and we present dual results for games with isotone
chain-convex best replies. A nal application to Bayesian games is exhibited.
Keywords Nash equilibrium uniqueness; Chain-concave best replies; Nice
games; Comparative statics; Strategic complementarity.
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1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium uniqueness has been a point of interest since the inception of
non-cooperative game theory. In his Ph.D. dissertation (see [25]), John Forbes
Nash posed the following rhetorical question about a possible interpretation of
the solution concept that took name after him:
What would be a rational prediction of the behavior to be ex-
pected of rational playing the game in question?
He answered that (Nash) equilibrium uniqueness, together with other con-
ditions of epistemic nature, are su¢ cient to expect that rational agents end up
behaving as prescribed by the solution concept he proposed for noncooperative
situations of strategic interaction:
By using the principles that a rational prediction should be unique,
that the players should be able to deduce and make use of it, and
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that such knowledge on the part of each player of what to expect the
others to do should not lead him to act out of conformity with the
prediction, one is led to the concept of a solution dened before.
His reasoning is not a conclusive argument by which one should expect that
the Nashsolution concept can be considered the reasonable prediction of play-
ersbehavior only in a non-cooperative game with exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, John Nash himself maintained later on in his thesis that in some classes
of noncooperative games some subsolutions can shrink the set of reasonable pre-
dictions to a singleton; besides, he o¤ered also a mass-action interpretation of
his solution concept for which solution multiplicity is not a problem. Nonethe-
less, the quotation well enlightens about the historical importance of the issue of
Nash equilibrium uniqueness in (non-cooperative) game-theoretic thought. The
present paper is devoted to analyze such issue.
On Nash equilibrium uniqueness in the class of games under examination
Many games are known to possess a multiplicity of equilibria and one cannot
hope to derive general conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium;
thus, in this work, we shall restrict attention to a particular class of games: the
class of nice1 games with isotone best reply functions. The isotonicity of
best reply correspondences, in some loose sense, is a very general expression of
the strategic complementarity among optimal choices of agents. Games with
isotone best reply correspondences have received a special attention in the
economic and game-theoretic literature because of the richness and easy intelli-
gibility of their equilibrium structure and properties. Such a literature started
from [31] and [32] had been popularized in economics by several articles dur-
ing the 1990s: just to mention a few, [21], [34], [23] and [22]. Some of the
just mentioned articles showed interesting properties implied by the existence
of a unique Nash equilibrium in classes of games that admit isotone selections
from best reply correspondences. For example, in such classes Nash equilibrium
uniqueness was proved to be: equivalent to dominance solvability (see Theorem
5 and the second Corollary at p. 1266 in [21], Theorem 12 in [23] and Proposi-
tion 4 in [1]); su¢ cient to establish an equivalence between the convergence to
Nash equilibrium of an arbitrary sequence of joint strategies and its consistency
with adaptive learning processes (rst Corollary at p. 1270 in [21] and Theorem
14 in [23]); su¢ cient to infer the existence and uniqueness of coalition-proof
Nash equilibria (see Theorem A1 and the last Remark at p.127 in [22]).
A new strand of the literature on nice games on networks, started a (still
partial) investigation about the conditions on utility functions for the existence
of a unique Nash equilibrium: [4], [3], [16] and [13] to mention a few. Except
1 I.e., games with a nite set of players whose strategy space is a closed proper real interval
with a minimum and whose utility function is strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinu-
ous in own strategy. The term nice game is introduced in [24] and our denition is similar but
not identical to the one therein.
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for [16],2 in such papers Nash equilibrium uniqueness is guaranteed by a type
of xpoint argument introduced by [19] in the economic literature whose ap-
plication requires the isotonicity of best reply functions.3 However, the general
structures of the primitives of a game with isotonebest replies ensuring the
existence of a unique Nash equilibrium are still unclear, despite a natural inter-
est of economic and game theorists in the understanding thereof; in particular,
the possible role played by the isotonicityof best-replies in determining Nash
equilibrium uniqueness is unclear. Of course, the literature o¤ers conditions on
the primitives of a game that ensure the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium,
but not many results seem to crucially depend on the condition of isotonicity
of best replies. Restricting attention to nice games with isotone best reply func-
tions, can we add something to known Nash equilibrium uniqueness results?
Our contribution
In this paper we shall examine the structure of the primitives of nice games
with isotone best replies ensuring Nash equilibrium uniqueness. Our inves-
tigation will make use of (a slight generalization of) the following xpoint
argument similar but not identical to the one in [19] which employes a notion
of generalized concavity, dened in Sect. 2, that we shall name chain-concavity.
Let f be a self-map of [0; 1]n with no xpoints on the boundary of
Rn+ (e.g., each fi could be positive). Then f has exactly one xpoint
if each component function fi is isotone and chain-concave.4
We shall derive four results actually one main result, one dualand two
extensions on the existence of exactly one Nash equilibrium in nice games.
Our main theorems dispense with any di¤erentiability assumption; but in case
of compact nice games with di¤erentiableutility functions, a corollary of one
of our main results by which the reader might readily gain an insight of our
ndings can be stated thus.5
Let   be a smooth compact nice game. Suppose each strategy set Si
has minimum 0. Then   has exactly one Nash equilibrium if, for
each player i, the marginal utility function Mi:
 is quasiincreasing in every argument other than the i-th one;
 has a chain-convex upper level set at height zero;
 is positive at (0; : : : ; 0).
2Nash equilibrium uniqueness in [16] is guaranteed by a result in [18] which does not
crucially depend on the isotonicity of best reply functions.
3 Indeed, [4] provide also alternative arguments which, however, still rely on the isotonicity
of best reply functions.
4E.g., f : [0; 1]4 ! [0; 1]4 : x 7! (x4; 1; x1 + x2   x1x2; (1 + x1) =2) has exactly one xpoint
by this xpoint uniqueness argument, and the xpoint is (1; 1; 1; 1). See also Remark 1.
5For the precise denitions ofMi and of a smooth compact nice game see Sect. 5; for the
precise denition of a chain-convex set see Sect. 2.
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In fact our main results do not rely on Fréchet di¤erentiability; nevertheless,
they are formulated by means of Dini derivatives, which can be economically
interpreted as generalized marginal utilityfunctions. The main advantage of
this analytical approach is that it allows to remain in the line of the marginalist
tradition while dealing with nondi¤erentiable utility functions. It must be clear,
however, that the contribution of our main results on the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium is not (only) the lack of di¤erentiability assumptions. In
Sect. 7 we shall explain why the previous statement on the uniqueness of Nash
equilibria in smooth compact nice games or some smoothvariant thereof for
unbounded strategy sets cannot be inferred from three classical theorems of
the literature on Nash equilibrium uniqueness: [28]s Theorem 2, [18]s Theorem
5.2 and [10]s Theorem 4.1.
To investigate the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions imposed on each
players generalized marginal utility function we shall preliminarily examine
the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions for the optimal solution of a
Choice Problem (see Sect. 3 for a precise denition) to be an isotone chain-
concave function. Such examination is in fact the main contribution of our
paper. A Choice Problem is a particular Type A problem and hence a problem
of comparative statics in the terminology of [26] and [20] where a parametrized
(strictly pseudoconcave upper semicontinuous) function is optimized on a xed
choice set (a compact proper real interval) for each possible given value of the
parameter. The function that associates with each value of the parameter the
optimal solution of a Choice Problem will be called a Choice function.
As it will be shown in Sect. 6 our analysis provides new results in terms
of the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions for both the (chain-)concavity
and the isotonicity of Choice functions. To the best of our knowledge, the
(chain-)concavity of optimal solutions has not been systematically studied in the
literature, but results that guarantee the chain-concavity and the concavity of
Choice functions can be useful also for some game-theoretic analysis of problems
that are not necessarily related to Nash equilibrium uniqueness6 . The isotonicity
of Choice functions has been investigated in the literature; however, our results
on this topic do not follow from well-known theorems such as [23]s Monotonicity
Theorem or other similar results of the subsequent literature (see, e.g., like those
established in [29], [9], [1] and tough in a more abstract spirit [20]). In fact
our results on the isotonicity of Choice functions are structurally similar to
Theorem 1 in [27] and hold for a class of problems which is properly included in
the class of problems for which Theorem 1 in [27] can guarantee the isotonicity
of Choice functions; nevertheless, our two di¤erential characterizations for the
particular class of problems we consider seems to be nothing similar to the
su¢ cient conditions on derivatives obtained in Sect. 2.4 in [27] and provide
two new alternative characterizations for certain classes of IDO families (in the
sense of [27]).
6See, e.g., also [6] and [7] for an instance of application of this type of results in the analysis
of multi-leader multi-follower games.
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Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents preliminary denitions
and notations; Sect. 3 introduces the concept of a Choice function for a Choice
Problem; Sect. 4 examines the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions of
a Choice Problem that guarantee the isotonicity and (chain-)concavity of the
associated Choice function; Sect. 5 provides four sets of conditions on (general-
ized marginal) utility functions that guarantee Nash equilibrium uniqueness in
nice games; Sect. 6 relates our results of Sect. 4 to [23]s Monotonicity Theorem
and to some results in [27], while Sect. 7 relates our results of Sect. 5 to three
classical theorems on the uniqueness of Nash equilibria; Sect. 8 consider games
of incomplete information. An Appendix illustrates the xpoint argument used
to establish our main results on the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and
contains some other mathematical facts.
2 Notation and denitions
2.1 Notation
Let f be a real-valued function on a proper real interval I. There are sev-
eral standard notations for the (four) Dini derivatives of f : ours is the same
of [17] (see denitions 3.1.47 at p. 56 therein). Thus the right-hand up-
per (resp. lower) Dini derivative of f at x0 6= sup I is denoted by D+f (x0)
(resp. D+f (x0)) and the left-hand upper (resp. lower) Dini derivative of f at
x0 6= inf I is denoted by D f (x0) (resp. D f (x0)).
Let f be a real-valued function on A  B, where A and B are nonempty
subsets of Euclidean spaces. Let (a; b) 2 AB. Sometimes we write f (; b)
to denote the function A! R : a 7! f (a; b) and we write f (a; ) to denote the
function B ! R : b 7! f (a; b). Thus, for instance, the expression f (; b) (a)
is perfectly equivalent to the expression f (a; b). Such a notation is standard;
however, for sake of clarity, we remark that when A is a proper real interval and
we write D+f (; b) (a) (or an analogous expression) we mean to indicate the
right-hand upper Dini derivative of f (; b) at a. (Obviously, D+f (; b) (a) is
well-dened and is not equivalent to the not even well-dened D+f (a; b).)
2.2 Denitions
The following generalized monotonicity notions are standard (and, for instance,
can be found at pp. 127-128 in [2] or at p. 1199 in [12]). However, in the
denitions, we prefer to use the term increasing instead of monotone to
remark the fact that our denitions are for functions on totally ordered sets.
Denition 1 An extended real-valued function f on a nonempty subset X of
the real line is:
 increasing i¤ (x; x) 2 X X and x < x) f (x)  f (x);
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 strictly increasing i¤ (x; x) 2 X X and x < x) f (x) < f (x);
 pseudoincreasing i¤
(x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  0) f (x)  0
and
(x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  0) f (x)  0;
 strictly pseudoincreasing i¤ (x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  0 )
f (x) > 0;7
 quasiincreasing i¤ (x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x) > 0) f (x)  0;8
 decreasing (strictly decreasing, pseudodecreasing, strictly pseudo-
decreasing, quasidecreasing) i¤  f is increasing (strictly increasing,
pseudoincreasing, strictly pseudodecreasing, quasiincreasing).
To dispel any doubts, the standard notion of a quasiincreasing function em-
ployed in this paper is very di¤erent from that in [19].
Table 1. Relation diagram for an extended
real-valued function f on a real interval
incr.
(decr.)
) pseudoincr.
(pseudodecr.)
) quasiincr.
(quasidecr.)
* *
str. incr.
(str. decr)
) str. pseudoincr.
(str. pseudodecr.)
Denition 2 Let fXigmi=1 be a family of nonempty subsets of R. An extended
real-valued function f on
Qm
i=1Xi is isotone (resp. antitone) i¤ f is increas-
ing (resp. decreasing) in every argument.
We introduce some generalized convexity notions. The denitions of a convex
set and of a concave and strictly concave functions are assumed to be known.
Denition 3 A subset X of Rn is chain-convex i¤
 2 [0; 1] , (x; x) 2 XX and xi  xi for all i = 1; :::; n ) x+(1  )x 2 X.
Denition 4 Let X be a chain-convex subset of Rn. A real-valued function f
on X is chain-concave i¤
 2 ]0; 1[ , (x; x) 2 X X and xi  xi for all i = 1; :::; n
+
f (x) + (1  ) f (x)  f (x+ (1  )x) .
A real-valued function f on X is chain-convex i¤  f is chain-concave.
7Or equivalently i¤ (x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  0 =) f (x) < 0.
8Or equivalently i¤ (x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x) < 0 =) f (x)  0.
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Fig 1. A chain-convex set Fig 2. A chain-convex set
It must be remarked that, per se, chain-concavity can be a very weak condi-
tion: for instance, every real-valued function dened on the grey set in Fig. 1 is
chain-concave. Needless to say, a convex set is also chain-convex and a concave
(resp. convex) function is also chain-concave (resp. chain-convex).
Remark 1 Let X be a nonempty chain-convex subset of Rm. If f is a twice
continuously di¤erentiable function on an open superset of X and
@f
@xi
(x)  0 and @
2f
@xi@xl
(x)  0 for all (i; l; x) 2M M X,
then f is chain-concave on X (to check this fact use, for instance, the second
order directional derivatives). If g and h are two chain-concave real-valued
functions on X then so is f = g + h (by the denition of chain-concavity).
Thus, from the previous two statements, we infer that: the function
f : [0; 1]
4 ! [ 1; 0] : (x1; x2; x3; x4) 7!  x1x2
is not concave but chain-concave (and antitone); the function
f : [0; 1]4 ! [0; 1] : (x1; x2; x3; x4) 7! x1 + x2   x1x2
is not concave but chain-concave (and isotone); the function
f : [0; 1]4 ! [1=6; 5=6] : (x1; x2) 7! 1
6
+
2x1 + 2x2   x1x2
8
+
7
48
x3 +
7
48
x4
is not concave but chain-concave (and strictly increasing in every argument).
Through this paper we consider a standard notion of an extended real-valued
quasiconcave function. Pseudoconcavity has been subject to several di¤erent
denitions: here we shall use a strict denition in terms of Dini derivatives
obtained from Denition 9 in [8]. (On this see also p. 577 in [14]; see also
Denition 2 in [15] for further generalizations of the non-strict version.)
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Denition 5 An extended real-valued function f on a convex subset X of Rn
is quasiconcave (resp. chain-quasiconcave) i¤ its upper level sets at nite
height9 are convex (resp. chain-convex). A real-valued function f on a convex
subset X of Rn is strictly quasiconcave i¤
 2 ]0; 1[ , (x; x) 2 XX and x 6= x) f (x+ (1  )x) > min ff (x) ; f (x)g .
A real-valued function f on a real interval X is strictly pseudoconcave i¤
(x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  f (x) ) D+f (x) > 0
and
(x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  f (x) ) D f (x) < 0.
In the following remark we recall some known facts: for the proof of (i) see,
e.g., Theorem 2.2.3 in [5]; (ii) follows directly from the denitions; (iii) follows
from part (ii) of Theorem 14 in [8]; for a proof of (iv) see, e.g., part (i) of Theorem
2.2.1 in [5]; (v) follows from (i) and the denition of strict quasiconcavity; (vi)
follows from Corollary 20 in [8]; for the proof of (vii) see the example contained
therein; (viii) follows from the denitions of a strictly pseudoconcave function
and of a strictly quasiconcave function.
Remark 2 Let f be a real-valued function on a real interval X. The following
facts are true:
(i) f is quasiconcave if and only if
 2 ]0; 1[ and (x; x) 2 X X ) f (x+ (1  )x)  min ff (x) ; f (x)g ;
(ii) if f is strictly concave then f is concave;
(iii) if f is strictly concave then f is strictly pseudoconcave;
(iv) if f is concave then f is quasiconcave;
(v) if f is strictly quasiconcave then f is quasiconcave;
(vi) if f strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinuous then f is strictly
quasiconcave;
(vii) the strict pseudoconcavity of f does not imply the quasiconcavity of f (e.g.,
the lower semicontinuous function and strictly pseudoconcave function
R! R : x 7!
 1
1+jxj if x 6= 0
0 if x = 0
is neither quasiconcave nor upper semicontinuous);
9The upper level set of f at height  2 R[f 1;+1g is fx 2 X : f (x)  g.
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(viii) if f is either strictly pseudoconcave or strictly quasiconcave then f can
possess at most one maximizer.
Table 2. Relation diagram for an upper semicontinuous
real-valued function f on a real interval
conc. ) quasiconc.
* *
str. conc. ) str. pseudoconc. ) str. quasiconc.
We remark a relation between strict pseudoconcavity and strict pseudode-
creasingness (see Theorem 1 at p. 1199 in [12] and references therein).
Remark 3 A real-valued di¤erentiable function f on a proper open real interval
is strictly pseudoconcave if and only if Df is strictly pseudodecreasing.
We remark some simple facts which can be easily proved by the reader.
Remark 4 Let X be a convex subset of Rm. Let f be an extended real-valued
function on X and g be a positive real-valued function on X. If f is quasiconcave
(resp. chain-quasiconcave) then f  g has a convex (resp. chain-convex) upper
level set at height 0.10
Remark 5 Let fXgmi=1 be a family of nonempty subsets of R. Put X =
Qm
i=1Xi.
Let f be an extended real-valued function on X. Besides let g be a positive real-
valued function on X and h be a nonnegative real-valued function on X.
 If f is strictly decreasing in every argument then f  g is strictly pseudo-
decreasing in every argument.
 If f is increasing in every argument (i.e., isotone) then f  h is quasiin-
creasing in every argument.
3 CP, C-functions and (D)NC-functions
Here below we shall dene a Choice Problem. Such a Choice Problem is nothing
but a function f on a real interval A which is parameterizedby the elements
of a subset B of Rm. The set A should be understood as the choice set and the
value attained by the function at a point a is interpreted as the value of a
choice for a given parameter b.
Denition 6 By a Choice Problem (CP in short) we mean a triple (A;B; f)
where: (i) A is a compact proper real interval; (ii) B is a nonempty subset of
Rm with m 2 N ; (iii) f is a function from A  B into R such that f (; b) is
strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinuous for all b 2 B.
10However f g it need not be quasiconcave (e.g., consider the function f : [0; 10]! R dened
by f (x) = ln (x+ 1=2) and the function g : [0; 10]! R++ dened by g (x) = 2 + sinx).
9
Notation (Df ; ~Df) With each CP we associate the functions
Df : int (A)B ! R[f 1;+1g : (a; b) 7! D f (; b) (a)
and
~Df : int (A)B ! R[f 1;+1g : (a; b) 7! D+f (; b) (a) .
In the following Sect. 4, we shall analyze how optimal choices change in
the parameter. In order to do this we formally dene an optimal choice for
a given parameter as the maximizer of f (; b). Clearly, as f (; b) is an upper
semicontinuous strictly pseudoconcave function on a compact set, there exists
exactly one maximizer for it, and hence exactly one optimal choice for each
parameter b 2 B. Sometimes, it will be convenient for us to make use of two
normalizations of the choice function.
Denition 7 Given a CP, by the Choice function (C-function in short)
associated to such a CP we mean the function
 : B ! A such that f (b)g = arg max f (; b) at all b 2 B,
by the Normalized Choice function (NC-function in short) associated to
such a CP we mean the function
 : B ! R+ : b 7!  (b) minA,
and by the Dually Normalized Choice function (DNC-function in short)
associated to such a CP we mean the function
 : B ! R+ : b 7! maxA   (b) .
4 Properties of a C-function
We now examine the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions for the isotonic-
ity, concavity and chain-concavity of a C-function. Dual results are provided.
4.1 Isotonicity of a C-function
The following Theorem 1 is the rst main result of this Sect. 4. See also Theorem
D2 in Appendix D for an extension of Theorem 1 pertaining the special case of
a family ff (; b)gb2B of functions that are continuously di¤erentiable on int (A).
Theorem 1 Consider a CP and the associated function . Suppose B is the
Cartesian product of m subsets of R. Then,  is isotone if and only if Df (a; )
is quasiincreasing in every argument11 for all a 2 int (A).
11Recall that Df (a; ) is a function from B =
Qm
i=1B into R[f 1;+1g. Thus the quasiin-
creasingness of Df (a; ) in every argument is somehow incorrectly the quasiincreasingness
of Df
 
a; (xl)
m
l=1

in xl for all l = 1; :::;m.
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Proof. If part. Suppose Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument for all
a 2 int (A). Pick (x; y) 2 B B such that x 6= y and xl  yl for all l = 1; :::;m.
It su¢ ces to show that  (x)   (y). If  (x) = minA then  (x)   (y).
Suppose  (x) > minA. By the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x),
D+f (; x) (a) > 0 for all a 2 [minA;  (x)[ .
Thus, by part (ii) of Theorem 1.13 in [11],
Df (a; x) = D f (; x) (a)  0 for all a 2 ]minA;  (x)[
and hence, by Lemma C1 in Appendix C,
Df (a; y) = D f (; y) (a)  0 for all a 2 ]minA;  (x)[
because Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument. Hence  (x)   (y):
otherwise  (y) <  (x) and D f (; y) (a)  0 for some a 2 ] (y) ;  (x)[ in
contradiction with the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; y).
Only if part. A consequence of Theorem D1 in Appendix D.
Corollary 1 Consider a CP and the associated function . Suppose B is the
Cartesian product of m subsets of R. Then
(i)  is antitone if and only if Df (a; ) is quasidecreasing in every argument
for all a 2 int (A);
(ii)  is antitone if and only if eDf (a; ) is quasidecreasing in every argument
for all a 2 int (A);
(iii)  is isotone if and only if eDf (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument
for all a 2 int (A).
Proof. (i) Reverse the product order of B and apply Theorem 1. (Indeed, as
B =
Qm
i=1Bi for some family fBigmi=1 of m nonempty real intervals, to reverse
the order of each Bi one can consider, for instance,  Bi.)
(ii) Reverse the order of A and apply Theorem 1. (To reverse the order of
A one can consider,for instance,  A.)
(iii) Reverse the product order of B and apply part (ii) of Corollary 1.
4.2 Positivity of a (D)NC-function
Our results on the (chain-)concavity of the C-function  will be established on
the subset of B where  is greater than minA and on the subset of B where
 is smaller than maxA (i.e., on the support of the NC-function  and of the
DNC-function ). Some simple facts about the necessity and su¢ ciency of
the conditions for B to coincide with the support of  (and with the support
of ) are remarked by the following Proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 Consider a CP and the associated functions  and . The
following six facts are true.12
(i) The support of  is B if and only if D+f (; b) (minA) > 0 for all b 2 B.
(ii) Assume that B has a least element, say !. Besides assume that B is the
Cartesian product of m subsets of R and that  is isotone. Then the
support of  is B if and only if D+f (; !) (minA) > 0.
(iii) Assume that B has a greatest element, say . Besides assume that B is
the Cartesian product of m subsets of R and that  is antitone. Then the
support of  is B if and only if D+f (; ) (minA) > 0.
(iv) The support of  is B if and only if D f (; b) (maxA) < 0 for all b 2 B.
(v) Assume that B has a greatest element, say . Besides assume that B is
the Cartesian product of m subsets of R and that  is antitone. Then
the support of  is B if and only if D f (; ) (maxA) < 0.
(vi) Assume that B has a least element, say !. Besides assume that B is the
Cartesian product of m subsets of R and that  is isotone. Then the
support of  is B if and only if D f (; !) (maxA) < 0.
Proof. (i) If part. A consequence of the denition of D+f (; b).
Only if part. Suppose the support of  is B. If D+f (; b) (minA)  0
for some b 2 B then f (; b) (minA) > f (; b) (x) for all x > minA by the the
denition of a strictly pseudoconcave function. Hence b 2 B would not be in
the support of : a contradiction.
(ii) If part. Suppose D+f (; !) (minA) > 0. Then  (!) > 0 and ! is in
the support of . The isotonicity of  implies that B is the support of .
Only if part. The same proof of the Only if partof (i): just put b = !.
(iii) Analogous to the proof of (ii).
(iv)-(vi) Analogous to the proofs of (i)-(iii).
4.3 Chain-concavity of a C-function
The following Theorem 2 is the other main result of this Sect. 4.
Theorem 2 Consider a CP and the associated functions  and . Suppose
B is the Cartesian product of m real intervals and that  is isotone. Besides
suppose  is positive. Then  is chain-concave if and only if Df has a chain-
convex upper level set at height 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we shall put minA = 0. Thus  equals the
NC-function .
12 It is perhaps worth to remark that the isotonicity of  is equivalent to the isotonicity of
 and to the antitonicity of .
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If part. Assume that Df has a chain-convex upper level set at height 0.
Suppose that x and z are elements of B such that
xi  zi for all i = 1; :::;m
and put
 :=  (x) and  :=  (z)
By the isotonicity of the positive function ,
0 = minA <   .
Pick  2 ]0; 1[ and put y := x+ (1  ) z. We are done if we prove that
 :=  + (1  )    (y) =: .
Case min f; g < maxA. Thus  = min f; g < maxA. Suppose, to the
contrary, that  < . Note that
D f (; y) () < 0 (1)
because f (; y) is a strictly pseudoconcave function maximized at , with
minA   <  < maxA.
Since  and  are respectively maximizers of f (; x) and of f (; z),
D f (; x) ()  0  D f (; z) ()
and hence
min fDf (; x) ;Df (; z)g  0 .
Therefore (; x) and (; z) belong to the upper level set at height 0 of Df , and
hence so does13 also (; y) by the chain-convexity of the upper level set at height
0 of Df . Therefore
Df (; y) = D f (; y) ()  0,
in contradiction with (1).
Case min f; g  maxA. Thus  =  = maxA. By the strict pseudocon-
cavity of f (; x) and f (; z),
D+f (; x) (a) > 0 < D+f (; z) (a) for all a 2 int (A) [ fminAg .
By part (ii) of Theorem 1.13 in [11], f (; x) and f (; z) are increasing on int (A);
consequently,
Df (a; x) = D f (; x) (a)  0  D f (; z) (a) = Df (a; z) for all a 2 int (A)
13Recall and this is important in this proof that xi  zi for all i = 1; :::;m and that
   (as  = min f; g).
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and hence
Df (a; y) = D f (; y) (a)  0 for all a 2 int (A)
by the chain-convexity of the upper level set at height 0 of Df . Thus we
must have  =  (y) = maxA = : otherwise  (y) 2 int (A) [ fminAg and
D f (; y) (a)  0 for some a 2 ] (y) ;maxA[ in contradiction with the strict
pseudoconcavity of f (; y).
Only if part. Assume that  is chain-concave. By way of contradiction,
suppose the upper level set of Df at height 0 is not chain-convex. Then there
exist (a^; x) 2 int (A)B, (a; z) 2 int (A)B and  2 ]0; 1[ such that
a^  a and xl  zl for all l = 1; :::;m,
D f (; x) (a^)  0  D f(; z) (a) , (2)
and
D f(; x+ (1  ) z) (a^+ (1  ) a) < 0. (3)
By the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x) and f(; z), (2) implies
 (x)  a^ and (z)  a.
Thus  (x)  a^ and (1  )(z)  (1  ) a, and hence
a^+ (1  ) a   (x) + (1  )(z).
As f(; x+ (1  ) z) (a^+ (1  ) a) is upper semicontinuous and also quasi-
concave, Theorem 2.5.2 in [5] and (3) imply that
(z + (1  ) z) < a^+ (1  ) a.
But then
(x+ (1  ) z) <  (x) + (1  )(z),
in contradiction with the chain-concavity of .
Corollary 2 Consider a CP and the associated functions ,  and .
(i) Suppose B is the Cartesian product of m real intervals and that  is anti-
tone. Besides suppose  is positive. Then  is chain-concave if and only
if Df has a chain-convex upper level set at height 0.
(ii) Suppose B is the Cartesian product of m real intervals and that  is anti-
tone. Besides suppose  is positive. Then  is chain-convex if and only
if eDf has a chain-convex lower level set at height 0.
(iii) Suppose B is the Cartesian product of m real intervals and that  is iso-
tone. Besides suppose  is positive. Then  is chain-convex if and only
if eDf has a chain-convex lower level set at height 0.
Proof. (i) Reverse the product order of B and apply Theorem 2.
(ii) Reverse the order of A and apply Theorem 2.
(iii) Reverse the product order of B and apply part (ii) of Corollary 2.
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4.4 Concavity of a C-function
We prove a variant of Theorem 2 for the concavity of a C-function  on the
support of the NC-function ; su¢ cient conditions for the concavity of  can be
easily derived by applying Proposition 1. Such a variant is established without
preliminary assumptions on the isotonicity of  and the positivity of .
Theorem 3 Consider a CP and the associated functions  and . Suppose B
is convex. Then  has convex support and  is concave thereon if and only if
Df has a convex upper level set at height 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we shall put minA = 0. Thus  = .
If part. Suppose the upper level set of Df at height 0 is convex. Choose x
and z in B such that
 :=  (x) > 0 <  (z) =: .
(Therefore min f; g > 0 = minA.) Pick  2 ]0; 1[ and put y := x+ (1  ) z.
We are done if we prove that
 :=  + (1  )    (y) =: .
Case min f; g < maxA. Suppose, to the contrary, that  < . Note that
D f (; y) () < 0 (4)
because f (; y) is a strictly pseudoconcave function maximized at , with
minA   <  < maxA:
Since  and  are respectively maximizers of f (; x) and of f (; z),
D f (; x) ()  0  D f (; z) ()
and hence
0  min fDf (; x) ;Df (; z)g .
Therefore (; x) and (; z) belong to the upper level set at height 0 of Df and
then so does also (; y) by the convexity of the upper level set at height 0 of
Df . Therefore
Df (; y) = D f (; y) ()  0,
in contradiction with (4).
Case min f; g  maxA. Thus  =  = maxA. By the strict pseudocon-
cavity of f (; x) and f (; z),
D+f (; x) (a) > 0 < D+f (; z) (a) for all a 2 fminAg [ int (A) .
By part (ii) of Theorem 1.13 in [11], f (; x) and f (; z) are increasing on int (A);
consequently,
Df (a; x) = D f (; x) (a)  0  D f (; z) (a) = Df (a; z) for all a 2 int (A)
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and hence
Df (a; y) = D f (; y) (a)  0 for all a 2 int (A)
by the convexity of the upper level set at height 0 of Df . Thus we must have  =
 (y) = maxA = : otherwise  (y) 2 fminAg [ int (A) and D f (; y) (a)  0
for some a 2 ] (y) ;maxA[ in contradiction with the the strict pseudoconcavity
of f (; y).
Only if part. Assume that  has convex support and is concave thereon.
By way of contradiction, suppose the upper level set of Df at height 0 is not
convex. Then there exist (a^; x) 2 int (A)B, (a; z) 2 int (A)B and  2 ]0; 1[
such that
D f (; x) (a^)  0  D f(; z) (a) , (5)
and
D f(; x+ (1  ) z) (a^+ (1  ) a) < 0. (6)
By the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x) and f(; z), (5) implies
 (x)  a^ > minA = 0 and (z)  a > minA = 0.
Thus  (x)  a^ and (1  )(z)  (1  ) a, and hence
a^+ (1  ) a   (x) + (1  )(z).
Note that x and z must be in the support of , and hence that x + (1  ) z
must be in the support of  (because of its convexity). As f (; x+ (1  ) z)
is upper semicontinuous and also quasiconcave, Theorem 2.5.2 in [5] and (6)
imply that
 (x+ (1  ) z) < a^+ (1  ) a.
Then
 (x+ (1  ) z) <  (x) + (1  )(z),
in contradiction with the concavity of  on its support.
Corollary 3 Consider a CP and the associated functions  and . Suppose
B is convex. Then  has convex support and  is convex thereon if and only
if ~Df has a convex lower level set at height 0.
Proof. Reverse the order of A and apply Theorem 3.
5 Uniqueness of Nash equilibria
This Sect. 5 contains four Nash equilibrium uniqueness theorems. Other four
results on some properties of a best reply function such as its isotonicity, its
concavity/convexity and its chain-concavity/chain-convexity implicitly used in
this Sect. 5 are presented in Appendix E as facts of independent interest.
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By a game   we mean a triple
 
N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N

where N = f1; :::; ng
is the set of players (i.e., a set whose elements are called players), Si 6= ; is
player is strategy set and ui :
Q
i2N Si ! R is player is utility function.
We denote by S the joint strategy set
Q
i2N Si. Adopting a standard game-
theoretic convention, sometimes we write s i instead of (sl)l2Nnfig and (si; s i)
instead of s or (sl)l2N .
Denition 8 We say that a game   is a nice game if, for all i 2 N :
 Si is a proper closed real interval with a minimum;
 ui is upper semicontinuous in the i-th argument;
 ui is strictly pseudoconcave in the i-th argument.
Denition 9 We say that a nice game   is a compact nice game if each Si
is compact and that a nice game   is an unbounded nice game if each Si is
upper unbounded.
Notation (!; ;Dui ; eDui) Given a nice game  , we shall denote by ! the
least joint strategy (i.e., (minSi)i2N ); given a compact nice game  , we
shall denote by  the greatest joint strategy (i.e., (maxSi)i2N ). Given a
nice game   and i 2 N , we shall denote by
Dui : int (Si) S i ! R [ f 1;+1g : (si; s i) 7! D ui (; s i) (si)
player is lower left-hand marginal utility functionand by
eDui : int (Si) S i ! R [ f 1;+1g : (si; s i) 7! D+ui (; s i) (si)
player is upper right-hand marginal utility function.
Note that in the following Denition 10, the utility function ui might well
be discontinuous in some argument j 6= i.
Denition 10 We say that a game   is a smooth game if, for all i 2 N :
 Si is a proper closed real interval with a minimum;
 ui (; s i) has a di¤erentiable extension ui (; s i), for all s i 2 S i.
Notation (Mi) Given a smooth game   (and chosen an arbitrary extension
ui (; s i) for all s i 2 S i, for all i 2 N) we shall denote by
Mi : Si  S i ! R : (si; s i) 7! Dui (; s i) (si) =
@ui
@si
(s)
player is marginal utility function.
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Remark 6 Let   be a smooth game. Then   is also nice if and only if each
marginal utility functionMi is strictly pseudodecreasing in the i-th argument.
As usual, a (pure strategy)Nash equilibrium is a xpoint of the set-valued
joint best reply function
b : S !Qi2N 2Si : s 7! (arg maxui (; s i))i2N
where ui (; s i) : Si ! R : si 7! ui (s). (I.e., e is a Nash equilibrium for   if and
only if ei 2 bi (e) for all i 2 N .) When player is best reply function bi is
single-valued, such bi can be understood as a function into Si: this observation
will be often used without further mention in sequel of Sect. 5.
In any nice game player is best reply bi can be understood as a partial func-
tion bi : S 9 Si dened by fbi (s)g = arg maxui (; s i) if arg maxui (; s i) 6= ;
(recall that in any nice game arg maxui (; s i) is either a singleton or the
empty set). Thus, when bi is nonempty-valued like, e.g., in compact nice
games such partial function is indeed a function bi : S ! Si dened by
fbi (s)g = arg maxui (; s i).
5.1 Bounded strategy sets
The following Theorem 4 provides su¢ cient conditions for a compact nice game
to possess exactly one Nash equilibrium: all additional conditions are imposed
only on playerslower left-hand marginal utility functions.
Theorem 4 Let   be a compact nice game.   has exactly one Nash equilibrium
(and no i-th component of such an equilibrium equals !i) if, for all i 2 N :
H1 Dui is quasiincreasing in the j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig;
H2 Dui has a chain-convex upper level set at height 0;
H3 Dui (; ! i) is not nonpositive.14
Proof. Suppose hypotheses H13 hold true. By Theorem 1, by Proposition
B1 in Appendix B and part (ii) of Proposition 1 and by Theorem 2, we can
conclude that each bi understood as a function is chain-concave, isotone and
never equal to !i. Theorem A1 in Appendix A guarantees the existence of
exactly one Nash equilibrium for  .
Theorem 4 can be dually reformulated as in the following Theorem 5,
where all additional conditions are now imposed only on playersupper right-
hand marginal utility functions.
Theorem 5 Let   be a compact nice game.   has exactly one Nash equilibrium
(and no i-th component of such an equilibrium equals i) if, for all i 2 N :
14Or equivalently Dui (; ! i) is positive at some strategy in int (Si).
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H1 eDui is quasiincreasing in the j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig;
H2 eDui has a chain-convex lower level set at height 0;
H3 eDui (;  i) is not nonnegative.
Proof. Let   := (N; (Si )i2N ; (u

i )i2N ) be the game where, for all i 2 N ,
Si =  Si and ui : s 7! ui ( s). Obviously, s is a Nash equilibrium for   if
and only if so is  s for  . Putting S i =
Q
l2Nnfig S

l and noting that
D ui (; s i) (si) =  D+ui (; s i) ( si) for all (si; s i) 2 int (Si ) S i
for all i 2 N , it can be easily veried by the reader that   satises all conditions
of Theorem 4. This ensures that   has exactly one Nash equilibrium. We can
conclude that   has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
5.2 Unbounded strategy sets
We shall now consider unbounded nice games and we shall extend Theorems 4
and 5 to the case of upper unbounded strategy sets. The compactness condition
on the strategy sets cannot be simply dropped, and additional conditions must
be imposed to guarantee the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6 Let   be an unbounded nice game. Suppose there exists s in the
topological interior of S such that
Dui
 
si ; s

 i

< 0, for all i 2 N . (7)
If conditions H13 of Theorem 4 are satised for all i 2 N , then   has exactly
one Nash equilibrium (and no i-th component of such an equilibrium equals !i).
Proof. We shall split the proof into two parts: existence and uniqueness. In the
rst part we shall construct a new game   which has a common Nash equilibrium
with   = (N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N ). In the second part we shall prove the existence
of at most one Nash equilibrium for  . Henceforth suppose H13 hold true.
Equilibrium existence. As usual, denote by b the joint best reply for  , but
consider it as a partial function from S into S: b can be considered as a partial
function because   is a nice game. Put
Si = [!i; s

i ] for all i 2 N and S =
Q
i2N S

i .
Since   is a nice game, (7) ensures that each bi is nonempty-valued at s; in
particular bi (s) 2 [!i; si ] for all i 2 N . We can extend the previous conclusion
to the entire S asserting that each bijS is a function into Si : to verify this
last fact it su¢ ces to note that hypothesis H1 and Lemma C1 in Appendix C
imply
Dui (z) < 0 for all z 2 S such that zi = si and zl  sl for all l 2 Nn fig
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and to repeat the reasoning for s at any such z. Therefore bjS can be under-
stood as a self-map on S; this fact in turn implies that bjS coincides with the
joint best reply, call it b, of the game   = (N; (Si )i2N ; (u

i )i2N ) where
ui = uijS for all i 2 N .
As bjS = b, the xpoints of b and b coincide on S; consequently, each Nash
equilibrium for   is also a Nash equilibrium for  . It can be easily seen that
  satises all conditions of Theorem 4 and hence   has a (unique) Nash
equilibrium, say e with ei > !i for all i 2 N ; such point e is a Nash equilibrium
also for  .
Equilibrium uniqueness. Suppose there exist two Nash equilibria for  , say
e and e. Let   = (N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N ) be the game where, for all i 2 N ,
Si = [!i;max fei ; ei g+ 1]
and ui = uijS with S =
Q
l2N Si. Since Si  Si for all i 2 N , we must have
that e and e are Nash equilibria also for   because e 2 S 3 e. But then we
have a contradiction, because   satises all conditions of Theorem 4 and hence
it cannot possess two distinct Nash equilibria.
The following Theorem 7 is not a dualof Theorem 6, though the structure
of their proofs is similar in many parts.
Theorem 7 Let   be an unbounded nice game. SupposeeDui (t; : : : ; t) < 0 for all i 2 N , for all su¢ ciently large t 2 R++.
If conditions H12of Theorem 5 are satised for all i 2 N , then   has exactly
one Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The structure of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.
Equilibrium existence. By assumption there exists a point, say s, in the
topological interior of S such thateDui (s) < 0 for all i 2 N .
Now the proof is exactly the same proof of that of Theorem 6: just replace
Duiwith eDuiand Theorem 4with Theorem 5.
Equilibrium uniqueness. Suppose there exist two Nash equilibria for  , say
e and e. Put
t = max fje1j ; : : : ; jenj ; je1j ; : : : ; jenjg .
Choose t > t such that eDui (t; : : : ; t) < 0 for all i 2 N (such a point t can be
found by assumption) and put
 = (t; : : : ; t) 2 Rn++.
Thus we have eDui (i;  i) < 0 for all i 2 N .
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Let   = (N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N ) be the game where, for all i 2 N , Si = [!i; i]
and ui = uijS with S =
Q
l2N Si. Since Si  Si for all i 2 N , we must have
that e and e are Nash equilibria also for   because e 2 S 3 e. However,  
satises all conditions of Theorem 5 and hence it cannot have two distinct Nash
equilibria.
6 Relation to other isotonicity theorems
We shall now relate our isotonicity Theorem 1 to other isotonicity theorems of
the literature, clarifying the possible di¤erences and what our result can add
to the literature. In particular, we shall relate Theorem 1 to the isotonicity
Theorem 4 in [23] and to the isotonicity Theorem 1 in [27].
Theorem 4 in [23] provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the iso-
tonicity of (a selection from) the set of maximizers of a parameterized function
in both the parameters and the choice sets (which in [23] are ordered under
Veinotts strong set order6S). The fact that the isotonicity is established in
both the parameters and the choice sets is an important di¤erence to our The-
orem 1 (where the choice set is xed). Thus, in principle, there is no reason to
conjecture that Theorem 4 in [23] implies our Theorem 1, or vice versa. This is
indeed the case: Theorem 1 is not implied by and obviously does not imply
Theorem 4 in [23]. Nevertheless, in a CP where B is the Cartesian product of m
subsets of R the quasiincreasingness of Df does not imply, but is implied by, the
single-crossing property15 of f in (a; b). The following Proposition 2 formally
claries the point.
Proposition 2 Consider a CP. Suppose B is the Cartesian product of m sub-
sets of R.
(i) If f satises the single-crossing property in (a; b) then Df (a; ) is quasiin-
creasing in every argument, for all a 2 int (A).
(ii) The converse of (i) is generally false.
Proof. (i) By Theorem 4 in [23],  must be isotone. Consequently Df (a; ) is
quasiincreasing in every argument for all a 2 int (A) by Theorem 1.
(ii) Put A = B = [0; 3] and consider the CP (A;B; f) where
f : (a; b) 7! 3  (2  a)2   (b+ 1) maxf0; (a  2)5g.
Note that Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument, for all a 2 int (A) while
f does not satisfy the single-crossing property in (a; b): Df (a; ) is obviously
quasiincreasing because
Df (a; b) =
8<:
4  2a > 0 if a < 2
0 if a = 2
4  2a  5 (a  2)4 (b+ 1) < 0 if a > 2
15Note that f (; b) is obviously quasisupermodular for all b 2 B.
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but the function
 : [0; 3]! R : b 7! f (11=4; b)  f (1; b) = 205
1024
  243
1024
b
is positive at b = 110 and negative at b = 2, and hence f does not not satisfy the
single crossing property.
The example in the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 2 and in particular
 gives evidence also of the fact that even the if part of Theorem 1 (resp.
Corollary 1) does not follow from any Proposition or Theorem in [20] where at
least one of the four conditions (7a), (7b), (7c), (7d) (resp. (8a), (8b), (8c),
(8d)) is involved.
Theorem 1 in [27] provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the iso-
tonicity of the C-function  associated to a CP. When attention is restricted to
CPs, our Theorem 1 is equivalent to Theorem 1 in [27] in the precise sense that
in a CP where B is the Cartesian product of m subsets of R the quasiincreas-
ingness of Df is equivalent to the condition that the family ff (; b)gb2B satises
the interval dominance order I (i.e., that it satises the implication
b0 2 B, b00 2 B, b00l  b0l for all l = 1; :::;m ) f (; b00) I f (; b0) .)
One of the contributions of our Theorem 1 is also the reformulation of the
previous implication in terms of (generalized) derivatives. Such a reformulation
is of interest because, like Proposition 2 in [27], it can be used to check whether a
parametrized family of functions is an IDO family (i.e., a family of functions that
obeys the interval dominance order). The following Example 1 shows that there
exist cases where our Theorem 1 can be used to check whether a parametrized
family of functions is an IDO family and Proposition 2 in [27] cannot.
Example 1 Put A = [0;    1] and B = f1=2; 1g and consider the CP where
f (; 1=2) : x 7! sin (x+ 1=2) + x and f (; 1) : x 7! sin (x+ 1) + x.
Theorem 1 certainly applies (because Df (; 1=2) and Df (; 1) are positive on
their domain) and hence ff (; b)gb2B is an IDO family by Theorem 1 in [27].
However, there does not exist any increasing positive function  : A ! R such
that
Df (; 1) (x)   (x)  Df (; 1=2) (x) for almost all x 2 A
(because otherwise
Df (; 1) (x)
Df (; 1=2) (x)   (x) for a.a. x 2 int (A) with  (x)   (0) > 0 for all x 2 A
in contradiction with the fact that Df (; 1=2) and Df (; 1) are continuous and
positive and that
lim
x" 1
Df (; 1) (x)
Df (; 1=2) (x) = limx" 1
cos (x+ 1) + 1
cos (x+ 1=2) + 1
= 0 =
D f (; 1) (   1)
D f (; 1=2) (   1));
thus Proposition 2 in [27] cannot tell us whether ff (; b)gb2B is an IDO family.
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Remark 7 In the previous example, f (; 1=2) and f (; 1) have continuously
di¤erentiable extensions. Clearly, our Theorem 1 can be applied also when f (; b)
is not continuous for some b 2 B. For example, consider the variant of the CP
in Example 1 where only f is modied by letting it be dened by
f (; 1=2) : x 7! sin (x+ 1=2)+x+b2xc and f (; 1) : x 7! sin (x+ 1)+x+b3xc .
Then (A;B; f) is still a CP and the functions Df (; 1=2) and Df (; 1) are still
positive possibly innite somewhere, of course and hence, again by Theorem
1 and by Theorem 1 in [27], we can conclude that ff (; b)gb2B is an IDO family.
7 Relation to other uniqueness results
Our Theorem 4 does not imply Theorem 2 in [28] and our Theorem 6 does
not imply either Theorem 5.1 in [18] or Theorem 4.1 in [10]. To show that our
Theorem 4 is not implied by Theorem 2 in [28] and that our Theorem 6 is not
implied by Theorem 5.1 in [18], we shall make use of the following elementary
but more restrictive immediate corollary of Theorems 4 and 6.
Corollary 4 Let   be a smooth nice game. Besides assume that one of the fol-
lowing two conditions holds: (i) Si is bounded for all i 2 N ; (ii) Si is unbounded
for all i 2 N and there exists s in Rn++ such that Mi (s) < 0 for all i 2 N .
Then   has exactly one Nash equilibrium if, for all i 2 N :
H1Mi is quasiincreasing in the j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig;
H2Mi is quasiconcave;
H3Mi (!) > 0.
The following Fact will show that in a certain class of symmetric games
both the conditions of Theorem 2 in [28] and those of Theorem 5.1 in [18] imply
the decreasingness of a certain balanced marginal utility function that we
shall denote by , while the conditions of our Theorems 4 and 6 are compatible
with its strict increasingness on some (innite) subsets of its domain. Part (vi)
will show an example that satises all conditions of Theorem 6 but not the
diagonally dominance condition assumed in Theorem 4.1 in [10]: hence our
Theorem 6 is not implied by Theorem 4.1 in [10].
Fact Suppose   is a symmetric smooth nice game where S1 = : : : = Sn = X.16
Pick an arbitrary j 2 N and let
 : int (X)! R : x 7! Mj (x; :::; x) .
16There are various notions of symmetry in the literature. For this Fact one is free to choose
any denition that satises the following implication:
i 2 N , i 2 N and x 2 X =) ui (x; :::; x) = ui (x; :::; x) .
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(i) If   satises all conditions of [28]s Theorem 2 then  must be decreasing.
(ii) If   satises all conditions of [18]s Theorem 5.1 then  must be decreas-
ing.
(iii) If   satises all conditions of Corollary 4 then  must be quasiconcave.
(iv) There exists a specication for   with X = [0; 1] such that   satises all
conditions of Corollary 4 and  is strictly increasing on X 0 = ]0; 1=12[.
(v) There exists a specication for   with X = R+ such that   satises all
conditions of Corollary 4 and  is strictly increasing on X 0 = ]0; 1=12[.
(vi) There exists a specication for   with X = R+ such that   satises all
conditions of Corollary 4 and @2u1@s1@s1 (1=24)
 <  @2u1@s1@s2 (1=24)
+ : : :+  @2u1@s1@sn (1=24)
 .
Proof. (i) The proof is immediate; however, the following fact must be re-
marked: if   satises the conditions of Theorem 2 in [28], then (3.10) in [28]
implies  
x1   x0   x0 P
i2N
ri +
 
x0   x1   x1 P
i2N
ri > 0
for all
 
x0; x1
 2 ]0; 1[  ]0; 1[ such that x0 < x1 (in [28] r is an element of Rn+
such that
P
i2N ri > 0) or equivalently, as
 
x1   x0Pi2N ri > 0,

 
x0

> 
 
x1

for all
 
x0; x1
 2 ]0; 1[ ]0; 1[ such that x0 < x1.
(ii) Analogous to the previous proof.
(iii) A consequence of the assumptions and of the denition of .
(iv) Consider the following symmetric game   =
 
N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N

where
N = f1; 2g, S1 = S2 = X = [0; 1], u1 (s1; s2) = 2s1 (2 + 2s2)   8s31 and
u2 (s1; s2) = 2s2 (2 + 2s1)  8s32. In this case,   satises all conditions of Corol-
lary 4 and the function
 : [0; 1]! R : t 7!  24t2 + 4t+ 4
is strictly increasing on X 0 = ]0; 1=12[.
(v) Exactly the same example exhibited in the proof of (iii), but for the
specication of X: now put S1 = S2 = X = R+.
(vi) Exactly the modied example in (v): just note that
@2u1
@s1@s1
(1=24) =  2 < 4 = @
2u1
@s1@s2
(1=24)
and conclude that the also part (vi) is true.
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The previous Fact has explained the key di¤erence between our unique-
ness results and Rosens and Karamardians uniqueness theorems (as well as all
uniqueness results of the literature like Theorem 1 in [16] that follow from
those two theorems but do not extend them). Also, by part (vi) of the previous
Fact, we can conclude that our Theorem 6 does not follows from Theorem 4.1
in [10]. Finally, we remark that Corollary 4 holds true even when we replace
H2 with the weaker condition H2* below:
H2* Mi has a chain-convex upper level set at height 0.
Clearly, when one replace H2with the weaker condition H2* , the conclusions
of part (iii) of the previous Fact do not generally hold true anymore.
8 Incomplete information
Our results on uniqueness of equilibria extend to some frameworks of incomplete
information where type sets are nite. Henceforth, by a Bayesian game we
mean17 a quintuple
G = (M; (Zl)l2M ; (Tl)l2M ; ((pl (j))2Tl)l2M ; (l)l2M )
where M = f1; :::;mg, with m > 1, is a nite set of elements called players and
for all l 2M :
 Zl is a nonempty set of elements called player ls strategies;
 Tl is a nonempty nite set of elements called player ls types;
 pl (j) : T l ! [0; 1] is, for all  2 Tl, a probability measure18 on the set
T l :=
Q
k2Mnflg
Tk;
 l : Zl  Z l  Tl  T l ! R is a function that associates a payo¤ to
player l with each joint strategy (zl; z l) in Zl  Z l and each joint type
(tl; t l) 2 Tl  T l, where
Z l :=
Q
k2Mnflg
Zk.
17 In fact we are following the interim formulation of the Bayesian game as described in Sect.
3 of [33].
18Henceforth we shall write pl ( j) instead of pl (j) (). Clearly,
P
2T l pl ( j) = 1. One
might interpret pl ( j) as the conditional probability for l that the joint type of ls opponents
is  when ls type is . However such an interpretation is not very important here.
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Henceforth we assume that (l; l) 2M M and l 6= l ) Tl \ Tl = ;.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a Bayesian game G is an m-tuple
 = (l : Tl ! Zl)l2M
of functions such that, for all l 2M ,
l () 2 arg max
P
2T l
l (;  l () ; ; )  pl ( j) for all  2 Tl
where  l () = (k (k))k2Mnflg. Henceforth, for all x 2
S
l2M Tl, we denote
by x^ the (only) element of M such that x 2 Tx^.
By aComplete information game   =
 
N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N

associated
to a Bayesian game G we mean a game where
N =
S
l2M
Tl
and where, for all i 2 N ,
Si = Z{^ and ui (s) =
P
2T {^
{^
 
si; (sk)k2 ; i; 
  p{^ ( ji) .
(Note that  2 T {^ is an (m  1)-tuple (1; : : : ;  {^ 1;  {^+1; : : : ; m) and hence an
ordered set; thus when we write k 2  we mean k 2 (1; : : : ;  {^ 1;  {^+1; : : : ; m),
and more generally k 2 f1; : : : ;  {^ 1;  {^+1; : : : ; mg.) A Nash equilibrium for  
is a joint strategy s 2 S such that
si 2 arg max
P
2T {^
{^
 ; (sk)k2 ; i;   p{^ ( ji) for all i 2 N ,
or equivalently, just substituting the symbol i with ,
s 2 arg max
P
2T ^
^
 ; (sk)k2 ; ;   p^ ( j) for all  2 N .
Thus, since fT1; :::; Tmg is a partition of N , we have that a Nash equilibrium
for   is a joint strategy s 2 S such that, for all l 2M ,
s 2 arg max
P
2T l
l
 ; (sk)k2 ; ;   pl ( j) for all  2 Tl.
Remark 8 Let G be a Bayesian game and   be the associated complete infor-
mation game. If (l : Tl ! Zl :  7! s)l2M is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for
G then (s)2N is a Nash equilibrium for  . If (s)2N is a Nash equilibrium
for   then (l : Tl ! Zl :  7! s)l2M is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for G.
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Corollary 5 Let G be a Bayesian game. For all l 2 M and for all (y; ; ) 2
Z l  Tl  T l, assume that Zl is a proper compact real interval with minimum
!l and that the function l (; y; ; ) is strictly concave and continuous. Put
! = (!l)l2M . Then G has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium if, for all
l 2M and for all (; ) 2 Tl  T l, the function
Dl; : int (Zl) Z l ! R : (x; y) 7! D l (; y; ; ) (x)
is:
(i) increasing in every argument other than the l-th one;
(ii) chain-concave;
(iii) such that Dl; (; ! l) is not nonpositive.
Proof. It is easily veried that, by the denition of ui, the game   satises
all conditions19 of Theorem 4. Hence   has exactly one Nash equilibrium. By
Remark 8, G has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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Appendix A: Fixpoint uniqueness
Theorem A1 Let I be a nite index set and fFigi2I be a family of compact
proper real intervals. Let f be a self-map of F =
Q
i2I Fi. Assume that each
component fi of f is isotone and chain-concave. Let
F x := ft 2 F : min fti  minFi : i 2 Ig = 0g .
Suppose no xpoint for f exists in F x. Then f has exactly one xpoint.
19 In particular,   is a compact nice game such that each ui is strictly concave in the i-th
argument and hence each
Dui : int (Si) S i ! R : (si; s i) 7! D ui (; s i) (si) ,
is dened by
D ui (; s i) (si) =
P
2T {^
D {^
 ; (sk)k2 ; i;  (si)  p{^ ( ji) ,
and is: (i) increasing in every argument other than the i-th one (i.e., every argument j 2
Nn fig); (ii) chain-concave; (iii) such that Dui (;
 
!|^

j2Nnfig) is not nonpositive.
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Proof. Each (Fi;) is a complete lattice, where  denotes the usual partial
order relation on R induced20 on Fi. Denote by  the usual product partial
order relation on F . Also (F;) is a complete lattice. By Tarskis xpoint
theorem there exist a least xpoint for f , say y, and a greatest xpoint for f ,
say z. We are done if we prove that y = z. By contradiction, suppose y 6= z.
Note that
minFi < yi  zi for all i 2 I,
where the rst inequality holds because y is a xpoint for f and f has not
xpoints in F x and the second because z is the greatest xpoint for f . Let
y# := ft 2 F : t  yg and y := y#n fyg ,
and let a (fy; zg) denote the a¢ ne hull of fy; zg. It can be easily observed that
a (fy; zg) \ y 6= ;. Pick
x 2 (a (fy; zg) \ y) ;
by construction, we can choose  2 ]0; 1[ such that
y = x+ (1  ) z:
By Tarskis xpoint theorem (see the last equality in the statement of Theorem
1 in [30]), f (t)  t for all t 2 y. Then
xl < fl (x) for some l 2 I.
Since fl (y)  yl = fl (z)  zl = 0 < fl (x)  xl, we have
fl (y)  yl <  (fl (x)  xl) + (1  ) (fl (z)  zl) ;
hence, since yl = xl + (1  ) zl, we have
fl (y) < fl (x) + (1  ) fl (z) .
But the last strict inequality contradicts the chain-concavity of fl.
The dualof Theorem A1 is the following Corollary A1 (which implicitly
underlies Theorems 5 and 7).
Corollary A1 Let I be a nite index set and fFigi2I be a family of compact
proper real intervals. Let f be a self-map of F =
Q
i2I Fi. Assume that each
component fi of f is isotone and chain-convex. Let
F q := ft 2 F : max fti  maxFi : i 2 Ig = 0g .
Suppose no xpoint for f exists in F q. Then f has exactly one xpoint.
20The lack of an index for  (i.e., the fact that we write  instead of the more correct i)
should not be a source of confusion.
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Appendix B: An equivalence proposition
Proposition B1 Let I be a proper closed real interval I with a minimum,
say w. Suppose f : I ! R is strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinuous.
Then D+f (w) > 0 if and only if D f is not nonpositive on int (I).
Proof. If part. Suppose D f is not nonpositive on int (I). Then there exists
k 2 int (I) such that D f (k) > 0. The upper semicontinuous strictly pseudo-
concave function f j[w;k] has a unique maximizer: call it x. Note that w < x
(otherwise the strict pseudoconcavity of f j[w;k] would implyD f (k) < 0). Thus
the inequality D+f (w) > 0 follows from the denition of a strictly pseudocon-
cave function.
Only if part. Suppose D+f (w) > 0. Let k 2 int (I). The upper semicontin-
uous and strictly pseudoconcave function f j[w;k] has a unique maximizer, say x,
and such a maximizer cannot be w, as D+f (w) > 0. Thus f (w) < f (x). By
the upper semicontinuity of f , we can well-dene
y := min

z 2 [w; x] : f (z)  f (w) + f (x)  f (w)
3
+ (z   w) f (x)  f (w)
3 (x  w)

.
Note that by construction
y 2 int (I)
and
f (z) < f (w) +
f (x)  f (w)
3
+ (z   w) f (x)  f (w)
3 (x  w) for all z 2 [w; y[ .
Since
f (y)  f (w) + f (x)  f (w)
3
+ (y   w) f (x)  f (w)
3 (x  w) ,
we can conclude that
f (y)  f (z)  (y   z) f (x)  f (w)
3 (x  w) for all z 2 [w; y] .
Thus D f (y) = lim inf
z"y
f(y) f(z)
y z  13 f(x) f(w)x w > 0.
Corollary B1 Let I be a proper closed real interval I with a maximum, say a.
Suppose f : I ! R is strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinuous. Then
D f (a) < 0 if and only if D+f is not nonnegative on int (I).
Proof. Just reverse the order of I and apply Proposition B1.
Appendix C: An equivalence lemma
Lemma C1 Let A  R be a proper interval and B be the Cartesian product of
m subsets of R. Let f : AB ! R and suppose f (; b) is strictly pseudoconcave
and upper semicontinuous for all b 2 B. Let
Df : int (A)B ! R[f 1;+1g : (a; b) 7! D f (; b) (a) .
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Pick an arbitrary a 2 int (A). Then Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argu-
ment if and only if
(x; x) 2 B B, xl  xl for all l = 1; :::;m and Df (a; ) (x)  0
+
Df (a; ) (x)  0.
Proof. If part. The proof is immediate and omitted.
Only if part. By way of contradiction, suppose that Df (a; ) is quasiincreas-
ing in every argument and that there exists a pair (x; x) 2 B B such that
xl  xl for all l = 1; :::;m, Df (a; ) (x)  0 and Df (a; ) (x) < 0. Then
Df (a; ) (x) = 0
by the quasiincreasingness of f (a; ) in every argument.
SinceDf (a; ) (x) < 0, there exists a 2 A such that a < a and f (; x) (a) >
f (; x) (a). Consequently, there exists a^ 2 [a; a[ that maximizes the upper
semicontinuous (and strictly pseudoconcave) function f (; x) j[a;a]; hence
Df (; x) (a) < 0 for all a 2 ]a^; a[
by the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x) j[a;a].
Since Df (a; ) (x) = 0, the denition of a strictly pseudoconcave function
implies that
f (; x) (a^) < f (; x) (a) ;
therefore
Df (a; ) (x) = 0 < f (; x
) (a)  f (; x) (a^)
a  a^ ,
and21 hence, by part (ii) of Theorem 1.8 in [11], there exists a 2 ]a^; a[ such
that
Df (; x) (a)  f (; x
) (a)  f (; x) (a^)
a  a^ > 0.
Thus
Df (a; ) (x) > 0 > Df (a; ) (x)
in contradiction with the quasiincreasingness of Df (a; ) in every argument.
The conclusion of Lemma C1 is not Then Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in
every argument if and only if Df (a; ) is pseudoincreasing in every argument.
Example C1 shows that such a conclusion would be wrong.
21Note that Df (a; ) (x) = 0 < f(;x
)(a) f(;x)(a^)
a a^ implies that, for some t 2 ]a^; a[,
f (; x) (t)  f (; x) (a^) > f (; x
) (a)  f (; x) (a^)
a  a^ (t  a^) .
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Example C1 Consider the CP where A = B = [0; 2] and
f : AB ! R : (a; b) 7!

6  j1  aj if b = 0,
a (2  a) if b > 0.
Note that f (; b) is strictly pseudoconcave and continuous, that
Df (1; 0) > 0 = Df (1; b) for all b > 0
and that Df (a; ) is positive for a 2 ]0; 1[ and negative for all a 2 ]1; 2[. We
can conclude that Df is quasiincreasing but not pseudoincreasing.
Appendix D: Theorem 1 revisited
Denition D1 By a Choice Problem# (CP# in short) we mean a triple
(A;B; f) where: (i) A is a compact proper real interval; (ii) B is a nonempty
subset of Rm with m 2 N ; (iii) f is a function from A  B into R such that
f (; b) is strictly quasiconcave and upper semicontinuous for all b 2 B.
With a CP# we associate a C-function  and a function Df : their denitions
are analogous to those of the functions  and Df associated to a CP (Sect. 3).
Denition D2 By a Choice Problem## (CP## in short) we mean a CP#
where f (; b) is continuously di¤erentiable on int (A) for all b 2 B.
Clearly, any CP is also a CP# (but the converse is not generally true) and
any CP## is also a CP# (but the converse is not generally true).
Theorem D1 Consider a CP# and the associated C-function . Suppose B
is the Cartesian product of m subsets of R. Then,  is isotone only if Df (a; )
is quasiincreasing in every argument for all a 2 int (A).
Proof. Assume that  is isotone and by way of contradiction suppose that
Df (a; ) is not quasiincreasing in the j-th argument for some a 2 int (A). Then
there exist a 2 int (A), x 2 B and y 2 B such that xj < yj , xl = yl for all
l = f1; :::;mg n fjg and
D f (; x) (a) > 0 > D f (; y) (a) .
Corollary 2.5.2 in [5] implies that f (; x) is strictly decreasing on [ (x) ;maxA]
and that f (; y) is strictly increasing on [minA;  (y)]. Thus
a 2 A and a >  (x) ) D f (; x) (a)  0
and
a 2 A and minA < a   (y) ) D f (; y) (a)  0.
Therefore a   (x) and a >  (y), which implies  (y) <  (y) in contradiction
with the isotonicity of .
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If attention is restricted to continuously di¤erentiableCPs, Theorem D2
generalizes Theorem 1. We do conjecture, however, that in Theorem 1 the strict
pseudoconcavity of each f (; b) cannot be replaced by the strict quasiconcavity
of each f (; b) unless additional assumptions on either the type of continuity or
the degree of di¤erentiability of each f (; b) are imposed (but, in this regard,
we do not have an illuminating example that clearly disproves our conjecture).
Theorem D2 Consider a CP## and the associated C-function . Suppose B
is the Cartesian product of m subsets of R. Then,  is isotone (resp. antitone)
if and only if Df (a; ) is22 quasiincreasing (resp. quasidecreasing) in every
argument for all a 2 int (A).
Proof. We shall consider only the case of isotonicity of : the case of antitonic-
ity of  is nothing but the dual. Also, the only if part follows from Theorem
D1: thus we shall prove only the if part. Assume that Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing
in every argument for all a 2 int (A). Pick (x; y) 2 B B such that x 6= y and
xl  yl for all l = 1; :::;m. By way of contradiction suppose
 (y) <  (x) .
By Corollary 2.5.2 in [5] we have that f (; x) is strictly increasing on [ (y) ;  (x)].
Pick a pair (a; a) such that
 (y) < a < a <  (x) .
Since f (; x) is strictly increasing on [a; a]  ] (y) ;  (x)[, a well known result
of Real Analysis ensures that
Df (; x) (a) > 0 for some a 2 ]a; a] .
Thus, as f (; x) is continuously di¤erentiable on ] (y) ;  (x)[, we have that
there exists a proper closed interval I  ]a; a[ such that a 2 int (I) and
Df (; x) (a) > 0 for all a 2 I.
Therefore, as f (; y) is di¤erentiable on int (A) and Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing
in every argument for all a 2 int (A), we have that
Df (; y) (a)  0 for all a 2 I.
Hence, by part (i) of Theorem 1.13 in [11], f (; y) must be increasing on int (I),
where
; 6= int (I)  [ (y) ;maxA] ;
but this is in contradiction with Corollary 2.5.2 in [5], by which f (; y) should
be strictly decreasing on [ (y) ;maxA].
22Clearly, D f (; b) (a) = Df (; b) (a) for all b 2 B and all a 2 int (A).
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Appendix E: On some properties of best reply functions
To the readers convenience, we provide some facts that can be readily inferred
from the results in Sect. 4 (Corollaries E13) and Appendix D (Corollary E4).
Corollary E1 Let   be a compact nice game   and i 2 N . Then player is
best reply function bi is isotone (resp. antitone) if and only if Dui is quasiin-
creasing (resp. quasidecreasing) in the j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig.
The variant in terms of the upper right-hand marginal utility functioneDui of Corollary E1 that follows from Corollary 1 is left to the reader.
Corollary E2 Let   be a compact nice game   and i 2 N . Assume that
Dui (; ! i) is not nonpositive (resp. that eDui (;  i) is not nonnegative) and
that Dui (resp. eDui) is quasiincreasing. Then:
(i) player is best reply function bi is isotone and greater than !i;
(ii) player is best reply function bi is chain-concave (resp. chain-convex) if
and only if Dui (resp. eDui) has a chain-convex upper (resp. lower) level
set at height 0.
The variant of Corollary E2 that concerns the case of an antitone best reply
function is left to the reader.
Corollary E3 Let   be a compact nice game   and i 2 N . Assume that
Dui (; s i) is not nonpositive (resp. eDui (; s i) is not nonnegative) for all s i 2
S i. Then:
(i) player is best reply function bi is greater than !i (resp. smaller than i);
(ii) player is best reply function bi is concave (resp. convex) if and only if
Dui (resp. eDui) has a convex upper (resp. lower) level set at height 0.
The variant of Corollary E3 which establishes the convexity of the set 
+ =
fs 2 S : bi (s) > !ig (resp. of 
+ = fs 2 S : bi (s) < ig) and the concavity
(resp. the convexity) of bi on 
+ (resp. 
+) is left to the reader.
Remark E1 Note that Corollary E3 implies a result for linear best reply
functions: just impose that bi is both concave and convex.
Introducing some denitions, we obtain a simple extension of Corollary E1
for the case of continuous di¤erentiability of ui in the i-th argument on int (Si).
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Denition E1 We say that a game   is a smooth# compact nice# game
if, for all i 2 N :
 Si is a proper compact real interval;
 ui is upper semicontinuous in the i-th argument;
 ui is strictly quasiconcave in the i-th argument;
 ui is continuously di¤erentiable in the i-th argument on int (Si).
Notation (M#i ) Given a smooth# compact nice# game  , we denote player
is marginal# utility functionby M#i : int (Si) S i ! R : s 7! @ui@si (s).
Corollary E4 Let   be a smooth# compact nice# game   and i 2 N . Player
is best reply function is isotone (resp. antitone) if and only if player is mar-
ginal# utility function M#i is quasiincreasing (resp. quasidecreasing) in the
j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig.
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